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Abstract 
This paper examines the extent of financial integration in European equity markets before, during and after the 
adoption of the single currency on 1 January 1999. Two groups of European economies are examined. The first 
set comprises the Member States of the European Union (EU) that participated in the euro (the Euro-11) 
[Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain]. 
The second set consists of the remaining Members of the Euro-15 [Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom] along with Norway and Switzerland. Multivariate cointegration procedures, Granger-causality tests 
and generalised variance decomposition analyses based on error-correction and vector autoregressive models are 
conducted to examine long and short-run relationships among these markets. The results indicate that there is a 
stationary long-run relationship and significant short-run causal linkages between the equity markets of both the 
euro and non-euro currency areas. However, while the large equity markets remain the most influential, the 
lower causal relationships that exist between these and at least some middle (Belgium, Spain and Netherlands) 
and small (Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland and Norway) equity markets suggests that opportunities for 
international portfolio diversification in European equity markets may still exist. 
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1. Introduction 
On 1 January 1999 eleven Member States of the European Union (EU) [Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain] 
completed the third and final stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by adopting a 
single currency. With the attainment of full EMU, these Member States (referred to as the 
Euro-11) have completed both the generational process of European economic integration and 
the decade long process of economic convergence timetabled at Maastricht in 1992. The steps 
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taken by the Euro-11 to achieve sustained economic convergence have already been well-
documented (Commission of the European Communities 1999: 18): 
Inflation has been brought down and kept under control; government budgetary 
positions have been adjusted significantly, with budget deficits reduced to within 
reasonable limits and the unsustainable upward trend in government debt ratios 
reversed; nominal interest rates have come down and the large differential, which used 
to exist, between Member States have narrowed dramatically, both for long-term and 
short-term rates and especially for Member States now participating in the single 
currency; exchange rates, which were subject to severe bouts of turbulence in 1992 
and 1993 and again early in 1995, have become progressively less volatile and, with 
the adoption of the euro, can no longer vary between members of the single currency 
zone. 
These structural and institutional changes will obviously have an impact on the level of 
European financial integration. As a starting point, there is the cogent argument that with the 
completion of EMU “…the European financial market will become truly integrated [with] the 
harmonisation of financial instruments and convergence towards the most efficient means of 
financing; a unified money market implying more intense competition between banks and 
financial intermediaries; [and] the elimination of the exchange-rate risk between participating 
countries” (Commission of the European Communities 1997). Furthermore, there is also the 
presumption that “…the introduction of a single currency will have significant effects, not 
only on the Member States which will not be participating but also on countries outside the 
European Union” (Commission of the European Communities 1997). Foremost amongst these 
are those Member States who did not fulfil the necessary conditions for participation in the 
single currency (Greece and Sweden) or who notified the European Council that they did not 
intend to move to the third stage of EMU (United Kingdom and Denmark). However, it is 
also expected that the internationalisation of the euro will have far-reaching repercussions for 
financial integration among non-Member European economies and “should first show itself in 
the countries which have close economic links with the European Union” (Commission of the 
European Communities 1997). 
The growing integration of European financial markets, both within and outside the single 
currency area and the European Union, has obvious implications for international portfolio 
diversification. Starting with the seminal studies of Levy and Sarnat (1970) and Solnik (1974) 
a voluminous empirical literature has arisen concerned with establishing the degree of 
correlation in international capital (equity) markets. If, and as has been hypothesised, low 
correlations of returns exist, diversifying across national markets allows investors to reduce 
portfolio risk while holding expected return constant. Unfortunately, “although a number of 
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articles dealing with the co-movements of the world’s equity markets are available, articles 
focusing solely on European equity markets are virtually non-existent” (Meric and Meric 
1997). Akdogan (1995: 119), amongst others, argues that this deficiency in the literature is 
particularly interesting:  
The absence of reliable empirical work on the integration of European capital markets 
makes it difficult to conclude that the EU securities markets are indeed integrated. One 
reason for this lack – only in the context of European finance – is a peculiarity of 
European capital markets. That European Union specialists and others do not deal 
empirically with capital market integration seems to imply that they find it more 
practical and interesting to capture institutional and procedural insights into the 
European internal market, or that the existence of a well-developed banking sector in 
Europe may have given a secondary role to European stock markets in the academic 
literature.  
Furthermore, even when European equity markets are examined in broader multilateral 
contexts (that is, in conjunction with North American and Asian capital markets), an emphasis 
is usually placed upon the larger economies. For example, Darbar and Deb (1997) included 
only the U.K. in their study of international capital market integration, Kwan et al. (1995), 
Francis and Leachman (1998) and Masih and Masih (1999) added Germany, Arshanapalli and 
Doukas (1993) excluded Germany and focused on France and the U.K., Cheung and Lai 
(1999) removed the U.K. and added Italy to France and Germany, and Solnik et al. (1996) 
and Longin and Solnik (1995) included Germany, France, Switzerland and the U.K. The 
obvious sample bias is equally noticeable in the studies that primarily concentrate on 
European equity markets. For instance, Espitia and Santamaria (1994), Abbott and Chow 
(1993), Shawky et al. (1997), Ramchand and Susmel (1998) and Richards (1995) included 
only five, seven, eight, ten and eleven European equity markets, respectively. As far as the 
authors are aware, no study to date has examined European capital market integration within 
the entire EU [namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,], 
irrespective of any changes arising from the adoption of a single currency. 
The present paper seeks to move the rather abstract nature of the debate over European 
economic integration to the somewhat firmer ground of European financial (equity) 
integration. In particular, we focus on the changes to the long-run relationships between 
European equity markets including the period when the third and final stage of EMU was 
achieved. We argue that two clear trends have emerged. Firstly, the interdependence among 
the Euro-11 equity markets has increased because of economic convergence before, during 
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and after the movement to a single currency. And secondly, the interdependence of non-euro 
participating equity markets (including both Member and non-Member States) has also 
increased over this period.  
The paper itself is divided into four main areas. The second section briefly surveys the 
empirical literature concerning international portfolio diversification in the European context. 
The third section explains the methodology and data employed in the present analysis. The 
results are dealt with in the fourth section. The paper ends with some brief concluding 
remarks. 
2. European financial integration 
Despite their relatively small size in terms of global market capitalisation, European equity 
markets have increasingly attracted non-European investors – particularly from the US and 
Japan –to the potential benefits of international diversification. However, it has been 
persuasively argued [see, for example, Akdogan (1995), Meric and Meric (1997), Friedman 
and Shachmurove (1997) and Cheung and Lai (1999)] that comparatively recent 
developments in the EU to deepen both political and economic integration have diminished 
the prospects for diversification by these groups. In fact, Akdogan (1995: 111) suggests that 
“in light of recent developments towards greater financial integration within the Union, one 
might argue that European equities are priced in an integrated market and not according to the 
domestic systematic risk content”. 
Within this evolving literature, four phases of European structural and institutional change 
vis-à-vis financial (equity) integration have been identified. To start with, in the early 1960s 
the idea of financial integration within the European Union [the then European Community 
(EC)] was firmly established. Consisting of six Member States at the time, the Council of 
Ministers adopted two directives setting out initial obligations for the removal of capital 
controls. These directives to deregulate capital transactions were closely associated with a 
number of basic financial freedoms proposed for the nascent Community, including short-
term and medium-term credit, personal capital movements, and investments and trading in 
quoted securities.  
In sharp contrast to the 1970s, marked as it was by the collapse of Bretton Woods and the 
OPEC oil crises, the early 1980s held more promise as the second phase of European financial 
integration. In the early and mid-1970s economic pressures were relieved, and the 
establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) saw many EC economies 
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participating in the central apparatus of the EMS, namely the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM), pursue a number of policies that brought about convergence in cost and commodity 
prices. At the same time, several Member States (led by Germany and the U.K.) 
independently removed all restrictions in capital markets in their domestic markets thereby 
accelerating the movement towards financial unity.       
The third phase in financial integration is associated with the European Commission’s 
initiation of a new ‘European approach’ to financial integration detailed in a 1983 
communication and the so-called White Paper of 1985 (Akdogan 1995). Together, these 
directives involved four areas of action towards full financial integration: (i) the removal of 
restrictions on capital movements and on the provision of financial services across national 
borders; (ii) a series of regulations to ensure the stable and efficient functioning of capital 
markets; (iii) tax harmonisation measures to remove fiscal distortions; and (iv) guidelines on 
the lending/borrowing activity of EC institutions. 
The final phase in the process of European financial integration covers the period between 
when the parts of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty dealing with economic and monetary union 
were being negotiated and the move into the third stage of EMU. Along with a number of 
institutional changes, in order to qualify for the final stage of EMU Member States were 
obliged to attain a high degree of sustainable economic convergence. Progress towards this 
objective was measured against a range of criteria, including inflation, government deficits 
and debt, exchange rate stability and long-term interest rates. Notwithstanding the obvious 
focus of economic convergence on the integration of European currency markets, the reaction 
of capital markets to developments in the European monetary sector has gone far towards 
quickening the pace of overall financial integration. 
It is within this evolving institutional setting that the empirical work on European financial 
(equity) integration has been framed. In one of the earlier studies, Espitia and Santamaria 
(1994) examined the prospects for international diversification among the capital markets of 
the EC. Using daily returns for the period October 1987 to September 1992 on the Madrid, 
Milan, Frankfurt, Paris and London stock markets, and specifying their analysis in both local 
currency and Swiss Francs, Espitia and Santamaria (1994) employed a vector auto-regressive 
(VAR) analysis to detect significant interrelations among markets, as well as identifying the 
information transmission mechanism. While the results indicated that a high level of 
correlation existed between daily equity returns in all markets, only London and Paris 
appeared to have any significant influence over the remaining markets. Moreover, the overall 
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level of influence fell when returns were expressed in a common currency. Using this 
evidence Espitia and Santamaria (1994: 10) concluded: “the growing internationalisation of 
economic activity has brought about a reduction of ‘domestic’ factors which have an effect at 
the national level. This has caused the parallel effect of a greater correlation among 
markets…on the whole what is suggested is that international diversification does not have an 
excessive economic rationality”. 
Employing an expanded sample of European equity markets [namely, U.K., Germany, 
France, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Spain] Akdogan (1995) also used national 
share market indices to analyse financial integration, though defined in terms of monthly 
returns over the period 1978 to 1986. Akdogan (1995: 123) also included three regime 
switches: 
One is 1983, when the new approach to financial integration was initiated; another is 
the year 1985, when the White Paper was introduced. A final one is 1987, when the 
White Paper was implemented as the ‘Single European Act’…it seems reasonable that 
the pricing of European Community securities will become more international as 
opposed to domestic as we move from 1983 to 1985, from 1985 to 1987, and finally 
from 1987 onwards.  
Employing a single-index EU capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Akdogan (1995) found 
that each market’s proportion of systematic risk as explained by the integrated model had 
increased over the sample period, and thereby concluded that all European equity markets 
appeared to be integrated.  
In contrast to the work of Akdogan (1995), more recent analyses of European financial 
integration have applied cointegration techniques. For example, Gallagher (1995) used 
weekly index data from the Irish, U.K. and German markets in conjunction with cointegration 
and Granger causality tests to examine short and long-run relationships before, during and 
after the 1987 stock market crash. However, the hypothesis of a greater degree of economic 
and financial integration was not supported, seemingly in contradiction to the fact that the 
“stock exchanges are connected by a common system of standards and regulation” (Gallagher 
1995: 144). Nonetheless, the analysis also indicated that “…there has been a significant 
increase in the correlation of short-run stock market returns as a result of a greater financial 
and economic integration with Germany [though] the increase is not sufficient to accept the 
hypothesis of no gains for Irish investors diversifying in to either the U.K. or German stock 
markets”.   
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Malliaris and Urrutia (1996) also employed an error correcting model (ECM) to examine 
long-term links and short-term causality in European equity markets (U.K., France, Italy, 
Germany and Belgium). Observing a two way long-term relationship between each pair of 
European equity indexes, Malliaris and Urrutia (1996: 28) reasoned that “the significant long-
term linkages reported in this paper…probably reflect the strong economic similarities that 
prevailed in these countries under our sample period and also their coordinated 
macroeconomic policies under a stable Exchange Rate Mechanism”.  
Nevertheless, evidence concerning European financial integration has been more mixed when 
samples have included smaller economies. For example, Friedman and Shachmurove (1997: 
274) found that while “the large stock markets of the EC (Britain, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) are found to be highly related, the smaller EC markets [Belgium, Denmark and 
Spain] are more independent”. This finding was used to suggest that investors could achieve 
larger gains from international portfolio diversification by including smaller markets in their 
opportunity set (Friedman and Shachmurove 1997). Likewise, while Cheung and Lai (1999) 
found long-term comovements in French, German and Italian stock market indices, the results 
indicated no significant evidence of cointegration when Belgium and the Netherlands were 
included. The Cheung and Lai (1999) study is particularly interesting in that the long-term 
comovements in equity returns were linked with similar comovements in macroeconomic 
variables, including money supply and industrial production.  
Lastly, Meric and Meric (1997) studied the comovements of the twelve largest European 
equity markets following the 1987 stock market crash. In common with earlier work by 
Gallagher (1995), Meric and Meric (1999) found that long-term comovements in equity prices 
increased, and hence international diversification benefits decreased, after this period. 
However, the average correlation coefficients of the minor European markets (including 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Austria) were generally smaller than the correlation 
coefficients of the larger economies. 
The existing literature regarding the degree of European financial integration and the 
concomitant potential for international portfolio diversification may be summarised as 
follows. First, most empirical studies to date have indicated that the major equity markets (ie. 
Germany, United Kingdom, France and Switzerland) are closely integrated, thereby 
diminishing the potential for European portfolio diversification. This holds for both studies 
with a European focus and those examined in a broader international context [see, for 
example, Kwan et al. (1995), Richards (1995), Leachman and Francis (1995) and Hanna et al. 
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(1999)]. However, evidence concerning financial integration in some of the smaller European 
equity markets (ie. Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, Norway, etc.) is more mixed.  
Second, evidence also exists that the level of financial integration is closely related to 
progress in EU economic convergence. That is, efforts to increase European monetary 
integration have been paralleled by adjustments in European financial integration. Akdogan 
(1995: 134) reasons that this makes EU capital markets an excellent sample to test financial 
integration, even before the adoption of the single currency: 
First, capital controls have been eliminated over EU exchanges. Second, exchange 
rates across the member states can float only within small margins. Third, indirect 
barriers, such as language difficulties, can be more easily assumed away for the EU 
investors who trade in EU markets than for other international investors who trade in 
other parts of the world.   
Finally, while much evidence exists concerning financial integration in major European 
equity markets, much less is known about financial integration across the full membership of 
the EU nor participants in the single currency area.      
3. Empirical methodology 
The data employed in the study is composed of value-weighted equity market indices for 
sixteen European markets; namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom. All data is obtained from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
and encompasses the period 1 January 1988 to 18 February 2000. MSCI indices are widely 
employed in the financial integration literature on the basis of the degree of comparability and 
avoidance of dual listing [see, for instance, Meric and Meric (1997), Yuhn (1997), Roca 
(1999) and Cheung and Lai (1991)]. Weekly data is specified. On one hand, it has been 
argued that “daily return data is preferred to the lower frequency data such as weekly and 
monthly returns because longer horizon returns can obscure transient responses to innovations 
which may last for a few days only” (Elyasiani et al. 1998: 94). However, Roca (1999: 505), 
amongst others, have countered that “…daily data are deemed to contain ‘too much noise’ 
and is affected by the day-of-the-week effect”. 
Within this data set, two time-series sub-periods and two market sub-groups are identified. 
The sub-periods consist of the period leading up to the adoption of the single currency 
(1/1/1988–25/12/1998) and a period comprising the entire sample (1/1/1988–18/2/2000). The 
two sub-groups consist of firstly, the eleven members of the EU who adopted the single 
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currency on 1/1/1999 (the Euro-11), and secondly, the four remaining members of the Euro-
15 which did not adopt the single currency (Sweden, Greece, United Kingdom and Denmark) 
and Norway and Switzerland (as non-members). The overall hypothesis is that the level of 
financial integration has increased in all European equity markets, regardless of participation 
in the euro or the EU, though significantly more so in the Euro-11 with the introduction of the 
single currency. 
The paper investigates the integration among European equity markets as follows. To start 
with, since the variance of a nonstationary series is not constant over time, conventional 
asymptotic theory cannot be applied for those series. Unit root tests of the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity are conducted in the form of an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression 
equation:   
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where itY  denotes the index for the i-th country at time t, 1−−=∆ ititit YYY , ρ  are coefficients 
to be estimated, p is the number of lagged terms, t is the trend term, α1 is the estimated 
coefficient for the trend, α0 is the constant, and ε is white noise. The critical values in 
MacKinnon (1991) are used in order to determine the significance of the test statistic 
associated with ρ. ADF tests for a deterministic trend are employed, and performed on both 
the levels and first differences of the indices. Where each index is nonstationary in levels and 
stationary in first differences, it may be concluded that the indices are individually integrated 
of order 1, I(1). An important property of I(1) variables is that there can be a linear 
combination of these variables that are I(0) (stationary). If this is so, then these variables are 
cointegrated such that there is some tendency for the two series in the long run not to drift too 
far apart (or move together).  
Following Engle and Granger (1987) suppose we have the set of m indices 
]',,[ 2,1 mtttt YYYy L=  such that all are I(1) and tt uy ='β is I(0), then β is said to be a 
cointegrated vector and tt uy =
'β  is called the cointegrating regression. The components of yt 
are said to be cointegrated of order d, denoted by yt ~ CI(d, b) where d > b > 0, if (i) each 
component of yt is integrated of order d, and (ii) there exists at least one vector β = (β1, β2, 
…., βm), such that the linear combination is integrated of (d - b). By Granger’s theorem, if the 
indices are cointegrated, they can be expressed in an Error Correction Model (ECM) 
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encompassing the notion of a long-run equilibrium relationship and the introduction of past 
disequilibrium as explanatory variables in the dynamic behaviour of current variables. This 
model thus allows a test for both short-term and long-term relationships between the indices. 
The ECM is specified as follows: 
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where , βα ′=Π , βα and  are rm×  matrices, Γ is the coefficients of the lagged difference 
terms, and all other variables are as previously defined. In (2) the long-run relationship is 
captured by 1
'
−tyβ , and the differenced terms and the terms which are adjusted by the long-
run relationship (the summation term on the right-hand side) capture the short-run 
relationship.  
In order to implement the ECM, the order of cointegration must be known. A useful statistical 
test for determining the cointegration order r is proposed by Johansen (1991) and Johansen 
and Juselius (1993). The test is based on the MLE and the rank of Π  (denoted by r) is tested 
based on its eigenvalues. Two tests viz. the maximum eigenvalue test and trace test, are 
proposed. In the trace test, the test statistic is: 
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where iλ  denotes the i-th greatest eigenvalues of Πˆ  and T is the number of useable 
observations. The test statistic (3) tests the null hypothesis on the number of distinct 
cointegrating vectors such as r = 0 versus r > 0, r ≤ 1 and so on. For example, to test for no 
cointegrating relationship, r is set to zero and the null hypothesis is 0:0 =rH  and the 
alternative is 0:1 >rH . Critical values for these statistics are tabulated in Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992). 
However, the Johansen (1991) test can be affected by the lag order k in (2). The lag order is 
determined by using both the likelihood ratio (LR) test and information criteria in VAR. The 
optimum number of lags to be used in the VAR models is determined by the likelihood ratio 
(LR) test statistic:  
 )ln()( 0 AKTLR ΣΣ−=        (4) 
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where T is the number of observations, K denotes the number of restrictions, Σ  denotes the 
determinant of the covariance matrix of the error term, and subscripts 0 and A denote the 
restricted and unrestricted VAR, respectively. LR is asymptotically distributed 2χ with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. The test statistic in (4) is used to test 
the null hypothesess of the number of lags being equal to k – 1 against the alternative 
hypotheses that k = 2, 3, … and so on. The test procedure continues until the null hypothesis 
fails to be rejected, thereby indicating the optimal lag corresponds to the lag of the null 
hypothesis.  
Finally, in order to examine the short-run relationships, Granger (1969) causality tests are 
specified. Essentially tests of the prediction ability of time series models, an index causes 
another index in the Granger sense if past values of the first index explain the second, but past 
values of the second index do not explain the first. If the indices in question are cointegrated, 
Granger causality is tested using the ECM: 
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where Θ  contains r individual error-correction terms, r are long-term cointegrating vectors 
via the Johansen procedure,  ψ  and γ are parameters to be estimated, and all other variables 
are as previously defined. If there is no cointegrated relationship, the causality tests are 
conducted using the following VAR model: 
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In both cases, the causality test is based on an F-statistic that is calculated using the 
constrained and unconstrained form of each equation. If the 
hypothesis ),,2,1(0 miijl L==γ fails to be rejected the j-th index does not Granger cause the 
l-th index, and current changes in l-th index cannot be explained by changes in the j-th index. 
If the hypothesis is rejected, the j-th country Granger-causes the l-th country and current 
changes in the l-th index can be explained by past changes in the j-th index, thereby indicating 
a casual relationship. 
One limitation of these tests is that while they indicate which markets Granger-cause a given 
market, they do not indicate whether yet other markets can influence a given market through 
other equations in the system. Likewise, Granger causality does not provide an indication of 
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the dynamic properties of the system, nor does it allow the relative strength of the Granger-
causal chain to be evaluated. However, decomposition of the variance of forecast errors of a 
given market allows the relative importance of the variance markets in causing fluctuations in 
that market to be ascertained. The decomposition process therefore allows the variance of the 
forecast errors to be divided into percentages attributable to innovations in all other markets 
and a percentage attributable to innovations in the given market. One problem here is that the 
decomposition of variances is sensitive to the assumed origin of the shock and to the order it 
is transmitted to other markets. To overcome this problem, a generalised impulse response 
analysis, which is not subject to any arbitrary othogonalisations of innovations in the system, 
is applied (Masih and Masih 1999).   
4. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the ADF unit root tests (1) for the sixteen European equity indices in price 
level and price-differenced forms. The first column for each form presents tests carried out for 
period 1/1/1988 to 25/12/1999 (prior to the introduction of the single currency) while the 
second column details the tests results for the longer period 1/1/1988 to 18/2/2000. In both 
instances, the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is tested. Analysis of the price levels series 
indicates non-stationarity for all markets except Austria in both sample periods. However, all 
of the ADF tests statistics are significant in differenced form, indicating stationarity and the 
suggestion that each index series (other than Austria) is integrated of order 1 or I(1). The 
finding of non-stationarity in levels and stationarity in first differences provides comparable 
European evidence to Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993), Leachman and Francis (1995), 
Malliaris and Urrutia (1996) and Kanas (1998), amongst others.  
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
Johansen cointegration tests are used in order to obtain the cointegration rank. Eigenvalues 
and trace test (3) statistics are detailed in Table 2 for the various null and alternative 
hypotheses. As multivariate cointegration tests the results cover each set of markets (ie. euro 
and non-euro participating) rather than simple bivariate combinations. They therefore 
consider the wide range of portfolio diversification options available to non-European 
investors, as well as the scope of financial integration that may not be reflected in pairwise 
combinations. Two sets of tests are included. The first group of tests corresponds to the nine 
markets that participated in the single currency [Austria is not included because it is of order 
I(0), while insufficient data existed to construct the tests for Portugal]. Critical values for 
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these statistics are obtained from Osterwald-Lenum (1992) and are detailed in the final 
column of Table 2. 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
In terms of euro-participating markets, and for the period up until the adoption of the single 
currency, both trace tests statistics are greater than the critical value for the null hypotheses of 
r = 0 and r ≤ 1 thereby rejecting the null hypothesis in both cases. However, in the period up 
until the adoption of the single currency the null hypothesis of r ≤ 2 fails to be rejected in 
favour r > 2 indicating the order of cointegration is 2. In the time series including the period 
since the adoption of the single currency, similar hypothesis are rejected up to, but not 
including, r ≤ 3 suggesting an order of integration of 3.  
The primary finding is that there is a stationary long-run relationship between the equity 
markets of the euro-currency area and that the number of long-run cointegrating relationships 
among euro-participating markets has increased when the period including the adoption of the 
single currency is analysed. Johansen and Juselius (1993) also point out that larger 
eigenvalues are associated with the cointegrating vector being more correlated with the 
stationary component of the underlying process, and therefore are suggestive of the relative 
strength of the long run relationship.  For both sets of markets (ie. euro and non-euro 
participating) the eigenvalues are larger when the period since the adoption of the single 
currency is included. Together, these suggest that the level of long-run financial integration 
among these markets has intensified. However, this result must be taken in context. The 
finding of a cointegrating vector across indices demonstrates that across the sample the 
markets have moved together in an equilibrium relationship. It does not mean, however, that 
there have not been sub-periods during which the indices have moved apart. 
For the non-euro participating economies in Table 2 the null hypothesis of r = 0 fails to be 
rejected in the period before the final of EMU, thereby suggesting that there is no long term 
cointegration for these indices. However, in period including the period since the final stage 
of EMU the null hypothesis of r ≤ cannot be rejected suggesting an order of cointegration of 
1. The suggestion in this case, is that no stationary long-run relationship existed between non-
euro participating economies prior to the introduction of the single currency, but that a long-
run relationship has been established when the final stage of EMU is included.  
Since cointegration exists between both sets of indices, that is, euro and non-euro 
participating markets, the Granger causality tests are performed on the basis of equation (5). 
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F-statistics are calculated to test the null hypothesis that the first index series does not 
Granger cause the second, against the alternative hypothesis that the first index Granger 
causes the second. Calculated statistics and p-values for the euro-participating markets are 
detailed in Table 3. Because the Austrian market was found to be stationary in levels, that is 
I(0), it is included in the Granger causality test procedure in levels, while all other markets are 
specified in first differences. The first matrix of test statistics in Table 3 relates to the period 
1/1/1988 to 25/12/1998. Among the ten participating markets (excluding Portugal) nineteen 
significant causal links are found (at the .10 level or lower). For example, column 2 shows 
that the French, Finnish, Luxembourgian and Belgian markets affect the Austrian market; the 
Irish market (column 6) is influenced by Spain and Austria; and France influences the 
Netherlands market (column 9).  
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
Further insights are gained by examining the rows in Table 3 indicating the effects of a 
particular market on all markets. It is evident that the French market is the most influential 
market in the single currency area, influencing Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Spain. In a similar cointegration approach, Friedman and Shachmurove 
(1997) also found that France affected the Belgian and German markets, while Meric and 
Meric (1997) established high pairwise correlations between France and Germany, Belgium 
and the Netherlands, though using a correlation approach. The least influential markets in 
terms of Granger-causality include Ireland, Germany and Italy. There is also an indication that 
there is feedback at play in several pairwise combinations: for example, Belgium Granger-
causes Finland and Finland Granger-causes Belgium.   
The second set of test statistics and p-values in Table 3 relates to the period including the 
third and final stage of EMU. The results in this sample period are broadly comparable to 
those found earlier with France being the market that Granger causes most other indices. 
While there is a small fall in the number of short-run causal links (from nineteen to sixteen), it 
is thought that the process of economic convergence that extends over much of the sample 
period already encompasses most of the changes brought about by the adoption of the single 
currency. However, caution should also be exercised in interpreting the fall in causal links 
since they reflect only the most direct causal linkage, and not the indirect influences from 
markets flowing through other markets. This is just one benefit of examining the variance 
decomposition as presented in Table 5. One implication of the results in Table 3, however, is 
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that there may be no gains from pairwise portfolio diversification between those countries 
where a significant causal relationship exists. Also since we have a finding of causality these 
markets must be seen as violating weak-form efficiency since one of the markets can help 
forecast the other. In all other cases, the absence of Granger causality implies that there are 
sufficient short-run differences between the markets for non-European investors to gain by 
portfolio diversification.  
Table 4 presents a similar analysis for the six equity markets that chose not to or could not 
participate in the single currency. All of these markets are also members of the EU with the 
exception of Norway and Switzerland. In the period leading up to the final stage of EMU 
there are eleven short-run causal relationships among these economies. For example, 
Switzerland Granger causes Greece and Sweden at the .01 level, the United Kingdom at the 
.05 level and Norway at the .10 level. Correspondingly, Sweden is Granger caused by Greece 
at the .05 level and Switzerland and the United Kingdom at the .01 level. In the period 
including the third and final stage of EMU the number of short-run causal relationships 
among these markets has increased to sixteen. The U.K. and Switzerland are still the markets 
that are most influential in term of the remaining markets. For example, Switzerland Granger 
causes Norway at the .10 level, Denmark at the .05 level and all remaining markets at the .01 
level. 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
Interesting, we find evidence for Granger causality at the .10 level of significance or lower for 
sixteen out of the thirty-six possible relationships in the sample. In many of these cases, a 
mutual relationship can be observed. As expected, the U.K. and Switzerland are the most 
influential markets in this sample, with the U.K. Granger causing four markets and 
Switzerland five. The dominant position of these markets, one being a non-EU member and 
the other a non-participant in the single currency, appears to have been unchanged in the 
period before and after the final stage of EMU.   
Table 5 presents the decomposition of the forecast error variance for 1-week, 4-week, 12-
week and 24-week ahead horizons for euro participating markets over the entire sample 
period. Each row indicates the percentage of forecast error variance explained by the column 
heading for the market indicated in the first column. At the 1-week horizon, the variance in 
the Austrian market is completely explained by its own innovations, whereas in the remaining 
markets some percentage of variance is explained by innovations in other markets. For 
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example, other markets explain 8.4 percent of variance in the Belgian market, 9.8 for Finland, 
48.1 for France, 64.9 for Germany, 20.4 for Ireland, 38.7 for Italy, 15.1 for Luxembourg, 60.1 
for the Netherlands and 65 for Spain. These would indicate that the Belgian market is the least 
influenced by innovation in other markets, while the Spanish market is the most sensitive.  
<TABLE 5 HERE> 
The evidence presented also reinforces the suggestion many smaller markets in the euro 
currency area are relatively isolated, and therefore prospects for international diversification 
still exist. Markets least explained by innovations in other markets include Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg. This effect also appears to persist for considerable periods 
of time. The results are also interesting in that they illuminate aspects of market interaction 
not indicated by the Granger causality tests. A notable example is the apparent dominance of 
France in Granger-causing five other euro-participating markets in this sample period. In the 
forecast variance decomposition of analysis, the French market still significantly influences 
other markets, especially Germany, Italy and Spain, but the variance explained for Ireland, 
Belgium, Finland and Austria is less than one percent.  
<TABLE 6 HERE> 
Table 6 details the results of a similar analysis conducted for the six non-euro participating 
markets. Once again, small markets such as Greece and Norway are least explained by 
variations in other markets (0 and 4.6 percent, respectively). Other markets explain some 23 
percent of the variance in the Swedish market, 32 percent of the Swiss, 27 percent of Danish, 
and 37 percent of the U.K. market after a one-week period. There is also generally a stronger 
interrelationship among the four members of the EU, though the variance in the Greek market 
is still very much unexplained by variations in the other markets.  
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates long-term and short-term relationships among sixteen European equity 
markets during the period 1988 to 2000. Eleven of these markets are participants in the third 
and final stage of EMU (the adoption of a single currency) while four of the five remaining 
markets are non-euro participating Member States of the EU. Multivariate cointegrating 
techniques are used to establish long-term relation
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caudsality tests are used to measure causal relationships in the short-term within an error 
correcting model (ECM).  
The results indicate, as expected, that the Euro-11 equity markets are highly integrated, both 
before and after the transition to the single currency. This long-term interdependency appear 
to be unaffected by the actual transition to the euro on 1 January 1999, albeit within a short 
sample period, and is indicative of the decade-long process of economic convergence spelt 
out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Broad structural and institutional changes, along 
convergence criteria aimed at achieving a high degree of sustainable economic convergence 
have ensured developments in the European monetary sector has gone far towards quickening 
the pace of overall financial integration.  
However, the level of financial integration within non-euro participating Member States and 
non-EU members has also increased over this period, especially when considering the period 
after the introduction of the single currency. Justification for this is not hard to find, especially 
since five of these markets are also Member States of the EU. Likewise, it has been known for 
some time that the U.K. and Denmark would not move to the final stage of EMU on 1 January 
1999, and that Greece and Sweden did not participate in the ERM in the two years ending 
February 1998 (as per the required convergence criteria). Accordingly, as markets not bound 
by the framework necessary for the conduct of economic policy in the euro area these mostly 
EU economies have just as much in common as the actual participants.  
The findings obtained in this paper have obvious implications for the purported benefits of 
international portfolio diversification among the several European equity markets. In effect, 
the strong short-term causality and long-term linkages among the national markets would 
indicate that the returns from such a strategy have diminished markedly. However, while the 
large equity markets in the U.K., France and Switzerland remain the most influential, the 
lower causal relationships that exist between these and at least some of the middle-sized 
(Belgium, Spain and Netherlands) and smaller (Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland and Norway) 
equity markets suggests that opportunities for diversification in at least some pairwise 
combinations may still exist. For example, France Granger-causes the medium-sized markets 
of Spain and Belgium and the smaller sized market of Finland, but there is no direct causal 
link from France to the Netherlands, Ireland or Luxembourg. This is further reinforced by the 
results of a decomposition of variance analysis that indicates that a distinguishing 
characteristic of most of the smaller markets is the extremely low level of variance explained 
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by other markets. For example, even among the euro-participating markets other markets 
explain less than ten percent of the variance in Austria, Belgium and Finland.  
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TABLE 1.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests 
 
 Price levels series Price differenced series 
  1/1/1988–
25/12/1998 
1/1/1988–
18/2/2000 
1/1/1988–
25/12/1998 
1/1/1988–
18/2/2000 
Austria AUS **-3.5565 **-3.6422 ***-14.5275 ***-22.3202 
Belgium BEL 1.7664 -2.2030 ***-6.6483 ***-6.6275 
Denmark DEN -1.1227 -0.9698 ***-13.0892 ***-7.0999 
Finland FIN 0.9159 3.1671 ***-8.7004 ***-4.3892 
France FRA -0.8957 0.6174 ***-8.0901 ***-7.1700 
Germany GER -1.1999 -0.6878 ***-7.5395 ***-6.3404 
Greece GRE -2.0021 -1.3614 ***-6.2135 ***-9.2346 
Ireland IRE -0.9846 -2.1938 ***-8.6462 ***-9.4469 
Italy ITA -0.0330 -0.9424 ***-7.0416 ***-7.9603 
Luxembourg LUX -2.2837 0.0163 ***-25.3446 ***-4.0372 
Netherlands NET -1.2897 -1.8765 ***-6.8987 ***-7.9509 
Norway NOR -2.0082 -2.2972 ***-14.9340 ***-10.2487 
Spain SPA 0.2533 -0.6856 ***-6.5620 ***-8.5033 
Sweden SWE -1.4866 1.4636 ***-7.5567 ***-3.5759 
Switzerland SWI -0.8395 -2.0164 ***-8.2985 ***-8.5349 
United Kingdom UK -0.9091 -1.8905 ***-7.9225 ***-17.1809 
Notes: Hypotheses H0: unit root, H1: no unit root (stationary); the lag orders in the ADF 
equations are determined by the significance of the coefficient for the lagged terms; for 
the price levels series, intercepts and tends are included, critical values at the .01, .05 and 
.10 percent level are -3.98, -3.42 and -3.13, respectively; for the price differenced series 
only intercepts are included, critical values at the .01, .05 and .10 percent level are -3.44, 
-2.87 and -2.57, respectively; asterisks denote significance at the *** – .01, ** – .05 and  *  
– .10 percent level.  
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TABLE 2.  Johansen cointegration tests 
  
1/1/1988–12/25/1998 1/1/1988–18/2/2000  
H0 H1 Eigenvalue Trace test Eigenvalue Trace test Critical value 
A. Euro participating markets 
r = 0 r > 0 0.1119 **224.760 0.2792 **403.958 192.890 
r ≤ 1 r > 1 0.0856 **167.847 0.0976 **197.053 156.000 
r ≤ 2 r > 2 0.0658 117.262 0.0762 **132.121 124.240 
r ≤ 3 r > 3 0.0553 79.325 0.0489 82.050 94.150 
r ≤ 4 r > 4 0.0435 47.162 0.0320 50.373 68.520 
r ≤ 5 r > 5 0.0268 27.225 0.0202 29.829 47.210 
r ≤ 6 r > 6 0.0207 15.295 0.0169 16.935 29.680 
r ≤ 7 r > 7 0.0157 5.277 0.0097 6.166 15.410 
r ≤ 8 r = 9 0.0096 0.120 0.0000 0.022 3.760 
Accepted 
 
 2  3  
B. Non-euro participating markets 
r = 0 r > 0 0.0580 91.595 0.1599 **174.568 94.150 
r ≤ 1 r > 1 0.0400 57.389 0.0455 64.486 68.520 
r ≤ 2 r > 2 0.0295 34.037 0.0337 35.077 47.210 
r ≤ 3 r > 3 0.0181 16.937 0.0139 13.428 29.680 
r ≤ 4 r > 4 0.0107 6.469 0.0072 4.584 15.410 
r ≤ 5 r = 6 0.0006 0.339 0.0001 0.047 3.760 
Accepted   0  1  
Notes: Group A – Includes Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Spain (Austria and Portugal are excluded because of stationarity and insufficient 
data, respectively); Group B – Greece, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and United 
Kingdom; .05 percent level critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992); the optimal lag order of 
each VAR model was selected using LR tests for the significance of the coefficient for maximum 
lags and Schwarz's Bayseian Information Criterion; in each cointegrating equation, the intercept 
(no trend) is included. 
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TABLE 3. Granger causality tests for euro participating markets, 1/1/1988–18/2/2000 
Period 1/1/1988 - 12/25/1998 
Market AUS BEL FIN FRA GER IRE ITA LUX NET SPA Causes 
AUS – 5.8649 1.7013 1.0603 1.2634 2.9062 0.5924 1.0413 0.5759 1.2918 2 
   (0.0158) (0.1927) (0.3036) (0.2615) (0.0888) (0.4418) (0.3080) (0.4483) (0.2562)  
BEL 0.0005 – 10.9889 0.3502 3.9604 0.2223 0.0866 0.5761 2.6885 2.8547 3 
 (0.9813)  (0.0010) (0.5543) (0.0471) (0.6375) (0.7687) (0.4482) (0.1016) (0.0917)  
FIN 0.0000 14.8890 – 1.4656 5.6638 0.1455 4.1913 2.5117 0.3344 1.6559 3 
 (1.0000) (0.0001)  (0.2265) (0.0177) (0.7030) (0.0411) (0.1136) (0.5633) (0.1987)  
FRA 5.4148 5.5820 0.0009 – 11.5036 0.1331 0.0741 8.0692 2.9398 4.0611 6 
 (0.0203) (0.0185) (0.9762)  (0.0007) (0.7154) (0.7855) (0.0047) (0.0870) (0.0444)  
GER 0.6244 0.7484 0.5065 0.1272 – 0.3587 1.3542 0.2144 0.0584 0.0010 0 
 (0.4297) (0.3874) (0.4770) (0.7214)  (0.5494) (0.2450) (0.6435) (0.8092) (0.9742)  
IRE 1.8068 1.5042 1.2648 1.2963 2.0649 – 0.9393 0.1696 0.1364 0.0344 0 
 (0.1794) (0.2205) (0.2612) (0.2554) (0.1513)  (0.3329) (0.6806) (0.7121) (0.8528)  
ITA 0.8390 0.0269 0.0410 0.9028 0.2109 2.0515 – 0.2426 0.2385 0.6050 0 
 (0.3601) (0.8698) (0.8395) (0.3424) (0.6463) (0.1526)  (0.6225) (0.6255) (0.4370)  
LUX 2.8627 1.4432 0.8082 0.4186 4.6707 0.1257 0.3792 – 1.0053 0.1137 2 
 (0.0912) (0.2301) (0.3690) (0.5179) (0.0311) (0.7230) (0.5383)  (0.3165) (0.7361)  
NET 0.8813 0.0001 2.9632 0.1409 0.6552 0.4414 0.1219 0.0613 – 0.7979 1 
 (0.3483) (0.9914) (0.0857) (0.7075) (0.4186) (0.5067) (0.7271) (0.8046)  (0.3721)  
SPA 0.1533 0.5615 1.5953 0.3276 2.9906 7.0972 2.3334 0.1798 0.8425 – 2 
 (0.6956) (0.4540) (0.2071) (0.5673) (0.0843) (0.0079) (0.1272) (0.6717) (0.3591)   
Caused  2 3 2 0 5 2 1 1 1 2 19 
Period 1/1/1988 - 18/2/2000 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER IRE ITA LUX NET SPA Causes 
AUS – 1.1451 0.0244 1.3800 0.9805 1.4670 0.1010 1.0504 0.7146 1.4344 0 
  (0.2850) (0.8760) (0.2405) (0.3225) (0.2263) (0.7508) (0.3058) (0.3982) (0.2315)  
BEL 0.3422 – 4.9196 1.2814 2.3223 0.0885 0.1587 6.6202 2.3034 1.8552 2 
 (0.5588)  (0.0269) (0.2581) (0.1280) (0.7662) (0.6905) (0.0103) (0.1296) (0.1737)  
FIN 0.1052 7.3453 – 0.1905 2.8695 2.1791 1.5939 1.8349 0.6427 0.0939 2 
 (0.7457) (0.0069)  (0.6627) (0.0908) (0.1404) (0.2072) (0.1760) (0.4230) (0.7594)  
FRA 5.2111 4.5432 4.8699 – 7.1181 0.2928 0.1883 0.8173 1.5578 6.4132 5 
 (0.0228) (0.0334) (0.0277)  (0.0078) (0.5886) (0.6645) (0.3663) (0.2125) (0.0116)  
GER 0.0000 0.0657 0.6780 0.0675 – 0.1236 0.0328 0.5645 0.0005 4.6229 1 
 (0.9959) (0.7978) (0.4106) (0.7952)  (0.7253) (0.8564) (0.4527) (0.9820) (0.0319)  
IRE 1.1434 4.5523 1.2144 0.0954 0.7176 – 0.2384 0.4143 0.3164 0.3426 1 
 (0.2854) (0.0333) (0.2709) (0.7576) (0.3973)  (0.6256) (0.5200) (0.5740) (0.5586)  
ITA 0.4661 0.2062 0.1629 1.9655 0.0243 1.4130 – 0.1926 0.1284 0.8922 0 
 (0.4951) (0.6499) (0.6866) (0.1614) (0.8762) (0.2350)  (0.6609) (0.7202) (0.3453)  
LUX 0.0181 4.2143 5.2163 0.2981 0.0603 1.8182 1.9409 – 0.0194 2.4306 2 
 (0.8930) (0.0405) (0.0227) (0.5853) (0.8061) (0.1780) (0.1641)  (0.8892) (0.1195)  
NET 0.0020 0.2126 2.0809 0.5819 0.5180 0.0209 0.0075 1.1332 – 0.2535 0 
 (0.9644) (0.6449) (0.1497) (0.4459) (0.4720) (0.8852) (0.9312) (0.2875)  (0.6148)  
SPA 0.2075 0.2030 2.8427 0.3171 0.4662 5.5288 3.2022 0.1574 0.3972 – 3 
 (0.6489) (0.6524) (0.0923) (0.5736) (0.4950) (0.0190) (0.0740) (0.6917) (0.5288)   
Caused 1 4 4 0 2 1 1 1 0 2 16 
Notes: Granger causality tests are conducted by adjusting the long-term cointegrating relationship by the ECM; figures in 
brackets are p-values; tests indicate Granger causality by row to column and Granger caused by column to row, for 
example, in the period 1/1/1988 - 18/2/2000 France (row) Granger causes five markets (AUS, BEL, FIN, GER and SPA) 
but is not Granger caused by any markets (using a critical value of .10); levels data is used in the ECM for Austria because 
of stationarity.  
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TABLE 4. Granger causality tests for non-euro participating markets 
Period 1/1/1988 - 25/12/1998 
Market GRE NOR SWE SWI DEN UK Causes 
GRE – 0.1760 4.7362 1.8603 1.1558 1.5902 1 
  (0.6750) (0.0299) (0.1731) (0.2828) (0.2078)  
NOR 2.4849 – 0.0471 0.0661 1.1289 0.0676 0 
 (0.1155)  (0.8282) (0.7972) (0.2885) (0.7950)  
SWE 1.9740 0.8491 – 12.9403 2.1314 3.1374 2 
 (0.1606) (0.3572)  (0.0003) (0.1449) (0.0771)  
SWI 8.3400 2.8844 32.7384 – 1.6770 5.6701 4 
 (0.0040) (0.0900) (0.0000)  (0.1958) (0.0176)  
DEN 0.5068 0.3082 1.2783 0.2871 – 0.0366 0 
 (0.4768) (0.5790) (0.2587) (0.5923)  (0.8484)  
UK 0.6588 10.8216 20.8338 6.7633 25.3819 – 4 
 (0.4173) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0095) (0.0000)   
Caused 1 2 3 2 1 2 11 
Period 1/1/1988 - 18/2/2000 
 GRE NOR SWE SWI DEN UK Causes 
GRE - 1.4212 16.1255 9.2572 1.6613 19.7781 3 
  (0.2337) (0.0001) (0.0024) (0.1979) (0.0000)  
NOR 3.5106 - 0.3814 0.5218 1.8535 0.0175 1 
 (0.0614)  (0.5371) (0.4703) (0.1739) (0.8949)  
SWE 3.5070 3.1543 - 8.6256 0.4650 1.1471 3 
 (0.0616) (0.0762)  (0.0034) (0.4956) (0.2846)  
SWI 9.0867 3.6682 21.6388 - 4.2675 9.4080 5 
 (0.0027) (0.0559) (0.0000)  (0.0393) (0.0023)  
DEN 0.1531 0.0116 0.7481 0.3625 - 0.0067 0 
 (0.6957) (0.9143) (0.3874) (0.5473)  (0.9349)  
UK 3.0290 11.8902 2.6908 9.1096 16.1923 - 4 
 (0.0823) (0.0006) (0.1014) (0.0026) (0.0001)   
Caused 4 3 2 3 2 2 16 
Notes: Granger causality tests are conducted by adjusting the long-term 
cointegrating relationship by the ECM; figures in brackets are p-values; tests 
indicate Granger causality by row to column and Granger caused by column to row, 
for example, in the period 1/1/1988 - 18/2/2000 the U.K. (row) Granger causes four 
markets (GRE, NOR, SWI and DEN) and is Granger caused by Greece and 
Switzerland (using a critical value of .10). 
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TABLE 5. Generalised variance decomposition for euro participating markets, 1/1/1988–18/2/2000 
MKT PER AUS BEL FIN FRA GER IRE ITA LUX NET SPA OTH 
AUS 1 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 4 98.982 0.063 0.064 0.696 0.008 0.113 0.052 0.002 0.001 0.019 1.018 
 12 98.830 0.069 0.077 0.790 0.010 0.131 0.069 0.001 0.001 0.022 1.170 
 24 98.794 0.071 0.080 0.812 0.011 0.135 0.073 0.001 0.001 0.022 1.206 
BEL 1 8.416 91.584 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.416 
 4 8.218 88.412 1.098 0.647 0.029 0.772 0.016 0.734 0.026 0.048 11.588 
 12 8.249 88.382 1.097 0.647 0.029 0.772 0.016 0.734 0.026 0.048 11.618 
 24 8.277 88.355 1.097 0.648 0.029 0.772 0.016 0.733 0.026 0.048 11.645 
FIN 1 1.515 8.278 90.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.793 
 4 1.475 8.439 86.952 0.805 0.001 0.491 0.009 0.971 0.437 0.419 13.048 
 12 1.476 8.439 86.950 0.805 0.001 0.491 0.009 0.972 0.437 0.419 13.050 
 24 1.478 8.439 86.949 0.805 0.001 0.491 0.009 0.972 0.437 0.419 13.051 
FRA 1 5.901 28.190 13.998 51.911 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 48.089 
 4 5.897 27.801 14.189 51.635 0.007 0.036 0.266 0.049 0.068 0.052 48.365 
 12 5.941 27.788 14.183 51.611 0.007 0.036 0.266 0.049 0.068 0.052 48.389 
 24 5.982 27.776 14.176 51.589 0.007 0.037 0.265 0.049 0.068 0.052 48.411 
GER 1 13.688 29.930 9.928 11.363 35.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 64.909 
 4 13.372 29.386 10.165 11.538 35.194 0.133 0.025 0.014 0.100 0.072 64.806 
 12 13.404 29.375 10.162 11.534 35.181 0.133 0.025 0.014 0.100 0.072 64.819 
 24 13.434 29.365 10.158 11.530 35.169 0.133 0.025 0.014 0.100 0.072 64.831 
IRE 1 5.281 7.565 4.459 0.775 2.346 79.575 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 20.425 
 4 5.090 7.502 4.656 1.054 2.303 78.316 0.041 0.171 0.021 0.846 21.684 
 12 5.142 7.497 4.654 1.054 2.302 78.272 0.041 0.171 0.021 0.846 21.728 
 24 5.190 7.494 4.651 1.054 2.301 78.232 0.041 0.171 0.021 0.846 21.768 
ITA 1 5.508 14.851 7.139 8.666 1.876 0.702 61.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 38.741 
 4 5.488 15.133 7.076 8.723 1.880 0.828 60.146 0.209 0.033 0.485 39.854 
 12 5.498 15.131 7.076 8.722 1.880 0.828 60.139 0.209 0.033 0.485 39.861 
 24 5.508 15.130 7.075 8.721 1.880 0.828 60.133 0.209 0.033 0.484 39.867 
LUX 1 1.095 7.662 2.528 2.754 0.890 0.046 0.015 85.010 0.000 0.000 14.990 
 4 1.091 7.655 2.483 2.803 1.464 0.228 0.060 83.981 0.203 0.030 16.019 
 12 1.120 7.653 2.482 2.803 1.464 0.228 0.060 83.956 0.203 0.030 16.044 
 24 1.146 7.651 2.482 2.802 1.464 0.228 0.060 83.933 0.203 0.030 16.067 
NET 1 7.084 29.821 5.625 9.741 6.403 1.368 0.005 0.067 39.886 0.000 60.114 
 4 6.999 29.278 5.791 9.560 6.515 1.548 0.012 0.067 40.168 0.061 59.832 
 12 7.021 29.271 5.790 9.558 6.514 1.548 0.012 0.067 40.159 0.061 59.841 
 24 7.042 29.264 5.789 9.556 6.512 1.548 0.012 0.067 40.150 0.061 59.850 
SPA 1 7.745 30.816 5.581 10.272 3.305 2.345 3.555 0.499 0.914 34.967 65.033 
 4 7.669 30.046 5.606 10.873 3.913 2.309 3.500 0.774 0.905 34.405 65.595 
 12 7.723 30.029 5.602 10.867 3.911 2.307 3.498 0.773 0.905 34.385 65.615 
 24 7.772 30.012 5.599 10.862 3.909 2.306 3.496 0.773 0.904 34.367 65.633 
Notes: The decomposition order is indicated by column; the final column (OTH) is the percentage of forecast error 
variance of the market indicated in first column (MKT) explained by all other markets except the market’s own 
innovations; the periods (PER) in the second column are in weeks. 
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TABLE 6. Generalised variance decomposition for non-euro participating markets, 1/1/1988–18/2/2000 
MKT PER GRE NOR SWE SWI DEN UK OTH 
GRE 1 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 4 95.379 1.861 0.005 2.270 0.060 0.426 4.621 
 12 95.379 1.861 0.005 2.270 0.060 0.426 4.621 
 24 95.379 1.861 0.005 2.270 0.060 0.426 4.621 
NOR 1 5.595 94.405 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.595 
 4 5.494 90.930 0.009 1.767 0.024 1.776 9.070 
 12 5.494 90.930 0.009 1.767 0.024 1.776 9.070 
 24 5.494 90.930 0.009 1.767 0.024 1.776 9.070 
SWE 1 6.867 16.849 76.284 0.000 0.000 0.000 23.716 
 4 8.131 15.528 70.700 5.127 0.051 0.463 29.300 
 12 8.131 15.528 70.700 5.127 0.051 0.463 29.300 
 24 8.131 15.528 70.700 5.127 0.051 0.463 29.300 
SWI 1 8.920 11.696 11.465 67.919 0.000 0.000 32.081 
 4 10.086 11.166 11.538 65.752 0.005 1.453 34.248 
 12 10.086 11.166 11.538 65.752 0.005 1.453 34.248 
 24 10.086 11.166 11.538 65.752 0.005 1.453 34.248 
DEN 1 4.424 14.010 5.792 2.441 73.333 0.000 26.667 
 4 4.394 13.361 5.681 4.233 69.885 2.446 30.115 
 12 4.394 13.361 5.681 4.234 69.884 2.446 30.116 
 24 4.394 13.361 5.681 4.234 69.884 2.446 30.116 
UK 1 3.622 14.284 8.960 8.568 1.441 63.125 36.875 
 4 6.415 13.644 8.579 9.142 1.384 60.835 39.165 
 12 6.415 13.644 8.579 9.143 1.384 60.835 39.165 
 24 6.415 13.644 8.579 9.143 1.384 60.835 39.165 
Notes: The decomposition order is indicated by column; the final column 
(OTH) is the percentage of forecast error variance of the market indicated in 
first column (MKT) explained by all other markets except the market’s own 
innovations; the periods (PER) in the second column are in weeks. 
 
